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ABSTRACT
Does country transparency affect international portfolio investment? We examine this and
related questions using some new measures of transparency and a unique micro dataset on
international portfolio holdings. We distinguish between government and corporate transparency.
There is clear evidence that international funds invest systematically less in less transparent
countries. On the other hand, herding among funds tends to be more prevalent in less transparent
countries. There is also some evidence that during crises, funds flee non-transparent countries by
a greater amount.
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
In policy circles, lack of transparency has frequently been blamed for the recent financial 
crises in emerging markets. For example, the IMF (2001) notes that a “lack of transparency was 
a feature of the buildup to the Mexican crisis of 1994–95 and of the emerging market crises of 
1997–98,” stating that “inadequate economic data, hidden weaknesses in financial systems, and a 
lack of clarity about government policies and policy formulation contributed to a loss of 
confidence that ultimately threatened to undermine global stability.” Consequently, the 
international financial institutions have actively promoted more transparency among their 
member countries as well as made strides to become more transparent in their own operations. 
The strive for more transparency presupposes that destabilizing behavior by individual 
investors can be avoided or attenuated by improved provision of information. For example, 
international investment funds may be more likely to engage in herding in less transparent 
countries (where herding is defined as funds taking investment decisions which they would not 
take if they did not observe other funds taking them). As a result, investors may rush in and out 
of countries even in the absence of substantial news about fundamentals.  
In theory, however, it is controversial whether lower country transparency yields higher 
herding or volatility.  On the one hand, one set of theoretical explanations of herding behavior 
relies on asymmetric information (e.g., Bikhchandani et al., 1992; Banerjee, 1992; Devenow and 
Welch, 1996; Bikhchandani and Sharma, 2000).  We would note that there is a natural linkage 
between low transparency and asymmetry of information.  Low transparency typically does not 
mean that no one knows anything. Rather, lower transparency means that less information is 
made publicly available, which in turn implies that the gap between those who know and those 
who do not becomes larger. Such higher informational asymmetry should therefore result in 
more herding.  
On the other hand, herding by institutional investors can be rationalized without an 
appeal to informational asymmetry at all, but instead by the incentives faced by fund managers 
that result from the need to have their performances compared periodically with a common 
benchmark (Scharfstein and Stein, 1990; and Chevalier and Ellison, 1999).  In this case, an   - 3 -   
improvement in a country’s transparency would not imply a reduction in international investors’ 
herding behavior.   
Related to this discussion, the theoretical link between availability of information and 
market volatility is ambiguous, as pointed out, among others, by Furman and Stiglitz (1998). 
While their argument is not specifically about herding behavior, it is about investors’ trading 
behavior in different information environments. In particular, they suggest that if more 
transparency means a higher frequency of information release (holding the true value of the 
fundamental constant), price volatility could increase rather than decline.  The notion that 
transparency may not necessarily reduce volatility is reflected in the recent literature on 
corporate transparency. In particular, Bushee and Noe (2000) report a positive association 
between corporate transparency and the volatility of the firm’s stock price. Firms with higher 
levels of disclosure tend to attract certain types of institutional investors which use aggressive, 
short-term trading strategies which in turn can raise the volatility of the firm’s stock price.  It is 
not clear whether this investor self-selection story can be generalized to international context.  
Ultimately, the effect of transparency on the behavior of international investors is an empirical 
question.  
International evidence on this question, however, is still lacking. To be sure, there are 
several empirical studies that measure the degree of herding among funds, including Lakonishok, 
Shleifer and Vishny (1992), Grinblatt, Titman and Wermers (1995), and Wermers (1999) for the 
U.S., Choe, Kho and Stulz (1999) and Kim and Wei (2002) for Korea, and Borensztein and 
Gelos (forthcoming)  for emerging markets worldwide. However, as far as we know, there is no 
paper that studies the connection between a country’s level of transparency and the degree of 
herding by international investors. 
Transparency may also affect the level of international portfolio investment in addition to 
its effect on herding. On this, there is less disagreement in the existing literature. In the corporate 
finance context, Diamond and Verrechia (1991), among others, have argued that a reduction in 
informational asymmetry can increase the investment from large investors and hence reduce the 
cost of capital for the firm (see Healy and Palepu, 2001, and Core, 2001, for reviews of the 
empirical literature on corporate disclosure). So far, there is no theoretical paper that has 
modeled explicitly the effect of a country’s transparency on the level of international portfolio   - 4 -   
investment
2. However, it seems reasonable to extrapolate from the corporate finance literature 
that an improvement in a country’s transparency can be expected to lead to an increase in the 
level of investment by international mutual funds.  
We aim to accomplish two main objectives in this paper. First, we investigate the effect 
of transparency in developing countries on the level of investment by international institutional 
investors. Second, we examine the effect of transparency on the degree of herding among funds 
(as well as related issues). Apart from the novelty of the questions examined, two important 
features of the paper are the construction of transparency measures and the use of a unique micro 
investment data set containing the country allocation of over 300 emerging market funds at a 
monthly frequency over 1996-2000. The investment information at the individual fund level 
allows us to measure herding behavior, which is not possible with aggregate data. 
  We distinguish between government and corporate transparency. Within the category of 
government transparency, we further differentiate between macroeconomic data availability 
(timeliness and frequency) and transparency in the conduct of macroeconomic policies.   
Corporate transparency refers to availability of financial and other business information about 
firms in a country on average.  It turns out that each measure contains information not captured 
by the other ones
3.  For example, the correlation between corporate transparency and government 
data transparency is 0.02, and the correlation between corporate and government macropolicy 
transparency is 0.54. 
                                                 
2 There are several somewhat related papers which we cannot survey completely here. Portes and 
Rey (1999) examine the role of information in explaining cross-border volume of equity flows, 
though they do not look at any measure of transparency at the country level. Wei (2000) studies 
the effect of corruption on inward foreign direct investment and bank borrowing, but not the 
effect of transparency on equity investment by international mutual funds. Using data on U.S. 
holdings of equities, Griever, and Warnock (2000) examine how informational asymmetries 
affect the home bias. 
3 Note that we do not focus on corruption, the rule of law, or specific corporate governance 
aspects, such as the degree of minority shareholder protection in this paper. Rather, we try to 
capture as accurately as possible the notion of information quality and availability.  
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  The main findings of the paper can be summarized here. First, there is relatively clear 
evidence that low transparency – or high opacity -- tends to depress the level of international 
investment. Government opacity and corporate opacity have separate, depressing effects on 
investment. Second, there is a moderate amount of evidence that low transparency in a 
developing country leads to an increase in the herding behavior by international investors. Thus, 
if herding by international investors contributes to a higher volatility or more frequent financial 
crises in emerging markets, it is not unrelated to the transparency features of the countries. Third, 
funds seem to react less strongly to news about country fundamentals in less transparent 
countries. Fourth, there is some evidence that during crises, funds flee non-transparent countries 
and invest in more transparent ones.  
    
2. Data 
 
  Two sets of variables are crucial for our analysis.  The first is a data set on investment 
positions by individual international funds in various countries.  The second set is related to 
various measures of transparency.  We explain the two sets of data in turn. 
 
2.1. Data on Emerging Market Funds 
 
We use data from a comprehensive database purchased from eMergingPortfolio.com 
(formerly Emerging Market Funds Research, Inc.). The database covers, on a monthly basis, the 
country asset allocation of hundreds of equity funds, a few of which have a global investment 
strategy, but most of which have a focus on emerging markets. The period covered is January 
1996–December 2000. At the beginning of the sample, the database contains 382 funds with 
assets totaling US$117 billion; at the end of 2000, the number of funds covered is 639, managing 
US$120 billion. Approximately one quarter of the funds are closed-end funds. The funds are 
domiciled mostly in advanced economies and offshore banking centers. We exclude single-
country funds.  
In February 1999, the sample consisted of 9 international funds (not focusing on 
emerging markets), 53 global emerging market funds, 125 Asian regional funds, 52 regional   - 6 -   
Latin American funds, and 39 funds focusing on other geographic areas. Approximately one 
quarter of the funds are closed-end funds. The assets of these funds represent a modest, but not 
negligible fraction of the total market capitalization. For example, in the case of Argentina, funds 
held approximately 6.5 percent of the total stock market capitalization in August of 1998, while 
the share was around 4.5 percent for Hungary and Korea.  
The data set provides asset positions in each country at a given point in time (month end). 
Since we are mainly interested in the flows to individual countries, we infer their values from the 
asset position data under some assumptions on changes in the stock valuation. In particular, we 
assume that in any given country, the funds hold that country’s index (or, more precisely, a 
portfolio of stocks that is well approximated by the IFC investable index.
4 We assume that flows 




Flowcit = [Assetsi,c,t – Assetsi,c,t-1 (1+ Index returnct)] /(1+ Index returnct)
1/2 (1) 
 
This obviously represents an approximation. However, consistency checks for closed-end 
funds show that our approximation is reasonable.
5  
 
2.2. Measuring (Lack of) Transparency 
 
In this paper, we use the term transparency to denote the availability and quality of 
information, measured at the country level. In particular, we focus on two categories of opacity: 
governmental and corporate. Within the category of government opacity, we construct separate 
measures for opacity in macroeconomic policies and opacity in the availability of 
macroeconomic information. For corporate opacity, we work with an index of availability and 
                                                 
4 Where the IFC does not compute an investable index, we used the global index. For countries 
not covered by the IFC, we employed MSCI US dollar index data or national indices converted 
into U.S. dollars. 
5 The correlation between imputed and actual changes in total assets is 0.93.    - 7 -   
reliability of corporate accounting information. In addition, we use a new composite index of 
opacity intended to combine information about opacity in accounting, regulation, the legal 
system, economic policy, and bureaucratic corruption. This index potentially crosses the 




  On government transparency, we look into two separate aspects. The first concerns the 
transparency and predictability of a government’s macroeconomic policies, and the second 
concerns the frequency and timeliness of government information release. 
We construct a measure of macro policy opacity based on two measures developed by 
Oxford Analytica for Wilshire Associates. Oxford Analytica produced detailed reports for 27 
countries, based on which it assigned scores to fiscal and monetary policy. For about half of the 
countries, Oxford Analytica relied heavily on the recent “Reports on Standards and Codes” 
(ROSCs) produced by the IMF. Because the ratings are largely based on the degree to which a 
government’s macro policies conform with the prescribed standards and codes rather than 
actually realized size of inflation or fiscal deficits, they have, in principle, been filtered by the 
impact of shocks to an economy. We use the sum of these scores, subtract it from ten, and label 
this variable MACROPOLICY OPACITY (See Appendix I). 
  We construct a measure of macro data opacity based on two indices developed by the 
IMF on the frequency and timeliness of national authorities’ macroeconomic data dissemination 
for all its member countries. The indices are available for 1996, 1997 and 2000 (Allum and 
Agça, 2001). We subtract these values from ten, construct a simple average of the two variables 
for each year and call it MACRODATA OPACITY. For the years 1998 and 1999, we use the 
values from 1997. 
 
Corporate Opacity 
The yearly Global Competitiveness Report produced by the World Economic Forum used 
to include results from surveys about the level of financial disclosure and availability of 
information about companies. Based on these results, we construct a summary variable called   - 8 -   
CORPORATE OPACITY (further details are given in Appendix I).  This gives us a one-time 
cross-country measure of average opacity in the corporate sector. 
 
Composite Opacity 
The accountancy and consulting company PriceWaterhouseCoopers conducted a survey 
of banks, firms, equity analysts, and in-country staff in 2000 to generate measures of opacity in 
five areas (PriceWaterhouseCoopers, 2001): bureaucratic practices (corruption), legal system, 
government macroeconomic policies, accounting standards and practices, and regulatory regime. 
We call this variable OFACTOR.  
 
Correlation Among the Opacity Measures 
A list of countries in our sample and their associated opacity measures are in Table A1. 
These different measures of opacity indeed appear to capture different aspects of country 
opacity: the correlation among them is positive but far from perfect (Table 1). The overall 
measures OFACTOR is strongly correlated with CORPORATE OPACITY (correlation 
coefficient =0.69), and the correlations between MACROPOLICY OPACITY and 
MACRODATA OPACITY is also quite high (0.63). The relationship between CORPORATE 
OPACITY and OFACTOR on the one hand and the macroeconomic opacity measures on the 
other hand is low. In order to highlight that the opacity measures measure something different 
than just economic development, the table also shows the correlation of the opacity indices with 
GDP per capita. The correlation of OFACTOR and CORPORATE OPACITY with GDP per 
capita is statistically significant but far from perfect.  
 
3. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
3.1 TRANSPARENCY AND COUNTRY ASSET ALLOCATION  
 
In this sub-section, we assess whether funds tend to allocate less money to less 
transparent countries. To do this, we need a benchmark on how international mutual funds would 
invest if all countries were equal on the transparency dimension. We take as our guidance the   - 9 -   
International Capital Asset Pricing Model, which predicts that international mutual funds should 
hold each country’s asset in proportion to its share in the world market portfolio. As an empirical 
proxy for the world market portfolio, we choose the popular MSCI Emerging Markets Free 
(EMF) Index produced by Morgan Stanley. The index is essentially based on market 
capitalization of a country’s stocks that are available to foreign investors. It is common for asset 
managers to report their positions relative this index and for investment banks to issue 
recommendations relative to it (e.g., “over-weight Singapore” means “advisable to invest more 
than Singapore’s weight in the MSCI EMF index”). Indeed, Disyatat and Gelos (2001) report 
evidence that the country allocation of dedicated emerging market funds can, to a large extent, be 
explained by the MSCI EMF index.  
The empirical strategy in this paper is to examine whether a country’s measure of opacity 
helps to explain mutual funds’ investment position after we take into account the country’s share 
in the MSCI EMF index. (We will also add other control variables later on.) To be more precise, 
we regress the actual country weights on benchmark index weights and measures of 
transparency. The EMF index includes only investment opportunities available to the 





t i j t j i ex OpacityInd w w ε γ β α + ⋅ + ⋅ + = , , ,   (2) 
  
where wi,j,t denotes the weight of country i in fund j’s portfolio at the end of period t and αj is a 
fund fixed effect. The right-hand side variables do not vary with the fund dimension j. For this 
reason, we allow for clustering of the errors around the country j dimension to avoid artificially 
inflated t-statistics.
6 The coefficient on OpacityIndex would be negative if emerging markets 
funds systematically invested less in less transparent countries. 
                                                 
6 See Rogers (1993). A less efficient alternative is to simply form averages by fund and allowing 
for serial correlation by country, and we obtain very similar results when proceeding this way. A 
related problem concerns the estimation of the effect of aggregate variables on micro data, since 
it requires awareness that errors are likely to be correlated within the groups formed by the 
aggregate variables (see Moulton, 1986). Aggregating by funds obviously solves this problem. 
Alternatively, we allow for clustering of the errors for each country-month group, and the effect 
of the transparency variables remains statistically significant.    - 10 -   
There are two things worth noting at the outset. First, the total market capitalization in 
any country must be held in the aggregate by some investors. In other words, not all investors 
can be “underweight” in less transparent countries. Therefore, our empirical investigation 
concerns whether and how the level of foreign investment relative to domestic investment is 
affected by opacity. Second, here we ignore any effect of transparency on a country’s share in 
the MSCI EMF index itself. It seems plausible that less transparency would inhibit the 
development of a country’s financial market, an issue we do not examine in this paper. To the 
extent that this is true, our estimates may underestimate the true negative effect of opacity on the 
level of international investment. Note, however, as long as the opacity measure is uncorrelated 
with the error term in the regressions, its coefficient estimate are still consistent albeit less 
precise if opacity is correlated with the share in the EMF index. 
The regression results are reported in Table 2. Without exception, lack of transparency 
is associated with lower exposure of emerging market funds. The overall opacity index and all 
four indices of corruption are statistically significantly and negatively correlated with country 
weights.
7 The estimated effect of opacity on international investment is not huge but not trivial 
either. For example, the estimate using OFACTOR as the opacity measure suggests that a 
country like Venezuela, currently represented with an average 0.4 percent weight in the sample’s 
portfolios, could achieve a 1.7 average higher percentage weight in fund portfolios if it increased 
its transparency to Singapore’s level.
8 
While we believe that the MSCI EMF index provides a good benchmark for our analysis, 
other factors might be relevant in determining the country allocation of funds’ assets. Therefore, 
we make an attempt to control for many that might be suspected of being correlated with 
                                                 
7 This finding is similar to that of Ahearne, Griever, and Warnock (2000), who find that an 
interaction variable of an index measuring rule of law and an index measuring accounting 
standards contributes to explaining U.S. holdings of foreign equities. 
8 The effect of opacity may depend on market capitalization. We therefore also used percentage 
deviations from the MSCI benchmark a dependent variable, leaving out the MSCI index as an 
explanatory variable. This reduces our sample since some countries have zero weight in the 
MSCI, but the main results are not affected. 
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opacity.
9 (1) Funds might prefer to be overweight in more liquid markets, and transparency 
measures might be proxying for market liquidity. Therefore, we include average turnover 
(average monthly value traded divided by mean market capitalization) as an additional variable. 
(2) Fund managers could prefer countries with strong protection of minority shareholders, and 
transparency might pick up this effect. Therefore, we include the summary variable on minority 
shareholder rights constructed by La Porta, López de Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998) and 
extended by Pistor, Raiser and Gelfer (2000) for transition economies in the regressions. (3) 
Countries classified by us as less transparent may be countries with closely held stock 
ownership. Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson (2001) point out that only a fraction of the market 
capitalization in most countries is available to international investors who are not controlling 
shareholders. They compute the percentage of firms closely held for many countries, and show 
that home bias by U.S. investors can largely be explained by this effect. We include their 
measure of closely held shares in our regressions. (4) One may also suspect that our opacity 
measures are likely to capture other factors associated with economic development, not 
necessarily market opacity. For this reason—although there is no clear justification for doing 
so—we also include GDP per capita as an additional explanatory variable. (5) Opacity indices 
may be capturing country risks more broadly rather than those specifically associated with lack 
of transparency. We therefore include monthly summary risk variables for economic, financial, 
and political risk produced by International Country Risk Guide.
10 Note that this in some sense 
represents an “overcorrection,” since the political risk measure captures some country 
characteristics that are related to transparency—in fact these variables have occasionally been 
used to measure transparency.
11 We also include a three-year moving average of mean returns to 
                                                 
9The MSCI index weights themselves may be a function of opacity: when a market becomes 
more transparent, it may grow and increase its weight in the index. If this were the case, it would 
make it harder to find any significant effects of opacity. 
10 For details, see Appendix B. Note that the ICRG variables have been used in the finance 
literature to derive expected returns. See Erb, Harvey, and Viskanta (1996). 
11 See Furman and Stiglitz (1998).   - 12 -   
capture the possibility that fund managers are return chasing. We allow for the effect of opacity 
to vary between tranquil and crises times.
12 
When including these control variables, all opacity variables continue to have negative 
and statistically significant coefficients, with their magnitude broadly unchanged (Table 3). 
Interestingly, during crises, the effect of opacity becomes less important. This possibly reflects 
panic selling across all emerging markets during a crisis when the distinction among countries in 
terms of opacity becomes less important. In any case, the negative effect of opacity on 
international investment (reported in Table 2) is not driven by crisis episodes in the sample. The 
coefficients on the other control variables mostly have the expected signs and are often 
statistically significant. An exception is that funds tend to prefer politically risky countries.  
Lastly, exchange rate regimes might potentially be correlated with opacity and fund 
managers may have a preference for certain types of exchange rate arrangements. While the 
ICRG variables contain a component related to exchange rate variability, in another 
specification, we therefore explicitly include monthly dummies for five different types of 
exchange rate regimes based on recent work by Reinhart and Rogoff (2002).
 Table 4 adds these 
variables describing the features of a country’s exchange rate regime to the list of control 
variables. We see that each of the opacity variable continues to be negative and statistically 
significant. Concerning exchange rate regimes, funds appear to have a “fear of floating.”
13 
A potential problem is that some of our opacity measures were constructed toward the 
end or even after the sample period. We therefore also use an earlier measure of corporate 
opacity, namely the accounting standard variable proposed by La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, 
Shleifer, and Vishny (1998).
14 The measure was published in 1991, and for Indonesia and 
Pakistan we use values published in 1993 following Doidge, Karolyi and Stulz (2002). We find 
that the degree of accounting opacity has a significant negative effect on holdings, with 
                                                 
12 We interacted the opacity variable with a crisis dummy, which was set equal to one for the 
period of the Asian, Russian, and Brazilian crises (97:07-98:01, 98:07-98:09, 99:01).  
13 Calvo and Reinhart (2002) show that governments suffer from a “fear of floating.” 
14 To be consistent with our other measures, we subtract the original variable from 100, so that 
higher levels denote higher accounting opacity.   - 13 -   
coefficients ranging from -0.025 (t-statistic: -4.06) in the simple regression to -0.034 (t-statistic: -
3.68) in a regression including control variables.  
These results are not the artifact of individual outliers. We compare the means of the 
differences between actual and MSCI index portfolio weights for samples in which the opacity 
variable was below or above its median (Table 5). The differences in portfolio weights for the 
two subsamples are in line with the regression results and the hypothesis of equality in means 
can always be rejected. 
 
A Horse Race Among Different Transparency Dimensions 
What is the relative importance of these dimensions of transparency? To assess this 
question, we run a simple “horserace” between our measures, including them jointly in 
regressions (Table 6). We do not include OFACTOR since it is a summary variable 
encompassing both corporate and macroeconomic transparency. When we do not include control 
variables except for the benchmark index weights (as in Table 2), the coefficients on each of the 
three opacity measures retain their approximate size and significance, while the government 
transparency variables become statistically insignificant. By contrast, when including control 
variables (as in Table 3), the coefficients become much larger in (absolute) size, with the 
coefficient on MACRODATA OPACITY turning positive. We therefore tentatively conclude 
that at least corporate opacity and macropolicy opacity separately contribute to a reduction in 
international investment. 
 
3.2. The Effect of Transparency on Investors’ Herding Behavior 
 
Is herding more or less prevalent in less transparent countries? To measure the extent of 
herding behavior, we compute a statistic of trading co-movement originally introduced by 
Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1992).
15 The measure allows us to assess whether funds move 
                                                 
15 Borensztein and Gelos (forthcoming) compute and discuss herding among the funds examined 
here. They find moderate, but statistically significant evidence for herding. The mean of HM 
across countries and over time is 7.7 percent, about twice as large as the number found for 
(continued…)   - 14 -   
in the same direction more often than one would expect if they traded independently and 
randomly. The indicator, denoted HM (for herding measure), is given by:  
 
  HMit = |pit-E[pit]| - E|pit-E[pit]|, (3)
 
where pit is the proportion of all funds active in country i in month t that are buyers: 
 
  ( )
() () t i ofSellers t i ofBuyers
t i ofBuyers
pit , # , #
, #
+
= ,  (4)
 
and E[pit] is its expected value. By taking the absolute value, the first term in equation (3) 
captures imbalances in both directions, buying or selling.  
 
The expected fraction of buyers E[pit] may vary over time—for example, there might be 
periods of large inflows into emerging market funds, during which we would observe most funds 
buying contemporaneously. We approximate E[pit] by the total number of net buyers across all 



















) , ( # ) , ( #
) , ( #
  (5)
 
Since the distribution of the absolute value of the first expression is not centered around 
zero, the expected value E|pit-E[pit]| needs to be subtracted. Under the null hypothesis of no 
herding, this expected value is calculated assuming that the number of buyers follows a binomial 
distribution. It should be pointed out that evidence for correlated trading patterns is a necessary, 
                                                                                                                                                             
domestic U.S. institutional investors. See Kim and Wei (2002a) and Choe, Kho, and Stulz (1999) 
for evidence of herding among international investors in Korea.   - 15 -   
but not sufficient condition for the existence of herding in a strict sense—the specific class of 
investors we are examining may react in the same way to news about fundamentals.  
We compute averages of HMit for each country over the 60 periods. To include only 
meaningful notions of “herds,” we include only observations with at least five active funds. 
Moreover, in order to limit the impact of approximation errors, we classify a fund as buyer or 
seller only if the absolute value of the calculated (out-) flow into (or from) a country is larger 
than three percent of the fund’s assets in that country. We then examine correlations between 
herding and country transparency. To our knowledge, this is among the first attempts to relate 
the degree of herding to country characteristics rather than investors. 
While herding is somewhat higher in less transparent countries, the relationship is weak. 
Mean herding values are higher for more opaque countries, although the difference is only 
significant at the 5 percent level for OFACTOR and at the 10 percent confidence level in the 
case of MACROPOLICY OPACITY and CORPORATE OPACITY (Table 7). Figure 2 shows 
the simple, unconditional relation between HM and OFACTOR. There is an apparent positive 
association between a country’s opacity and the tendency for international investors to herd 
when investing in this country’s assets. 
The results are similar when including control variables. We regress these herding 
averages on our country transparency indices, average turnover and average market 
capitalization (Table 9).
16 Mean turnover (defined as the country average of monthly value 
traded divided by market capitalization) should proxy for market liquidity. Herding strategies are 
likely to be easier to implement in more liquid markets, where the price impact of any trade is 
lower. Concerning market size, Borensztein and Gelos (forthcoming) report that herding is more 
pronounced in larger markets, and we therefore include size as a control variable in these simple 
regressions. The coefficients on two transparency measures, namely OFACTOR, and 
CORPORATE OPACITY are significant at the five percent level. In some cases, the included 
variables explain a substantial fraction of the variation of herding across countries (the R
2’s 
range from 0.01 to 0.3). When including GDP per capita as an additional regressor, only 
                                                 
16 Wherever we have time variation in the transparency levels, such as in the case of 
MACRODATA OPACITY, we use simple averages of the variables.   - 16 -   
OFACTOR remains significant at the five percent level (CORPORATE OPACITY is still 
significant at the 10 percent level). 
We again carried out a horserace between transparency measures (not shown): since the 
number of observations shrinks to 23 while the number of explanatory variables increases, the 
estimates loose precision and none of the transparency indices remains significant at the 5 
percent level. 
Similarly to our finding on investment levels, the relationship between the degree of 
herding and opacity appears to be weaker during crises. We computed the herding measure for 
only the crisis months mentioned earlier. In the regressions, none of the opacity variables was 
significant at the five percent level (not reported to save space).  
 
3.3 The Reaction to News 
 
An issue closely related to herding is the reaction of investors to news. Timely and 
comprehensive data dissemination by national authorities are intended to avoid situations in 
which any piece of bad news––whether accurate or not—is potentially seen by market 
participants as the tip of a hidden iceberg, with ensuing panicky reactions which be quickly 
magnified by herding behavior.  
Furman and Stiglitz (1998) argue that the mean of investors’ expectations is unlikely to 
be affected by a lack of transparency. However, the variance of expectations across investors is 
likely to be higher and their prior beliefs flatter. Any information received might therefore have a 
larger effect on investors’ beliefs. 
On the other hand, news about more transparent countries will on average convey more 
useful information than news about opaque countries, so that markets may react more strongly to 
news in transparent markets. Put differently, if one thinks of signals (news) as composed of a 
“fundamental” plus an error term (whose variance is a function of transparency), the reaction to 
news should be lower the higher the variance of the error term. Core (2001) and Shu (2000) 
make this point in the context of corporate disclosure. This view is consistent with the notion that 
in transparent markets, investment decisions are largely driven by the reaction to news about 
fundamentals rather than by herding behavior.   - 17 -   
In order to assess whether funds react differently to news depending on the degree of 
country opacity, we relate changes in country portfolio weights to revisions in Consensus GDP 
forecasts (CONSNEWS).
17 First, we regress changes in portfolio weights on CONSNEWS and 
an interaction variable of CONSNEWS multiplied with the various transparency variables to 
assess the differential effect of opacity.
18 Then, again we include control variables to assess the 
robustness of our results. The regressions are of the form: 
 
 
t j i i j t i
t i t i t j i
CONSNEWS ControlVar
CONSNEWS ex OpacityInd CONSNEWS w
, , ,
, , , ,
ε ν η γ
β α
+ + + ⋅ ⋅
+ ⋅ ⋅ + ⋅ = ∆
  (6)
 
where ∆wi,j,t denotes the change of weight of country i in fund j’s portfolio at the end of period t, 
ηj and νi are fund and country fixed effects, and εijt is an error term. 
After controlling for other country variables, including risk factors, the results show that 
the reaction to news is more muted in more opaque countries (Table 9). The only exception is the 
effect of CORPORATE OPACITY. The results also indicate that funds react more strongly 
about news in larger and more liquid markets, since the interaction terms with market 
capitalization and turnover are significantly positive. The results are robust to the inclusion of 
country random effects. 
 These result suggest that the signal-to-noise ratio regarding macroeconomic 
fundamentals is indeed lower in more opaque countries. Accordingly, after the release of positive 
macroeconomic news, fund managers may want to wait for further confirmation before engaging 
in a costly reallocation of assets across countries.  
 
 
                                                 
17 The surveys are published at the end of month in which they are conducted. We use a 
weighted average of current-year and year-ahead forecasts: in February, the current-year forecast 
is given a weight of 5/6, and next year’s forecast a weight of 1/6, and so forth. We call the 
bimonthly difference between these forecasts CONSNEWS.  
18 Note that we do not include the opacity variable as a separate regressor, since opacity levels 
should not have an effect on changes in country weights.   - 18 -   
3.4 Flows during crises 
 
While the overall relationship between herding and opacity is of interest, a more specific 
question concerns the extent to which difference in opacity helps to explains which countries are 
more likely to be hit by outflows during crises. Are more opaque countries more prone to 
contagion effects? Do transparency measures, beyond and above macroeconomic indicators, 
explain the degree of confidence loss across countries during turbulent times? 
Johnson and others (2000) have examined whether measures of corporate governance, in 
particular the effectiveness of minority shareholder protection, help explain the extent of 
currency depreciation and stock market decline across countries during the Asian crisis. They 
find that corporate governance variables can account for a larger fraction of the variation in 
performance than standard macroeconomic variables. The fact that their regressions contain only 
25 observations, however, limits inference. For example, when including GDP per capita, the 
coefficients on corporate governance variables become insignificant. It is therefore not clear 
whether other country characteristics correlated with economic development, such as 
transparency as defined here, is driving the results. 
We relate the size of monthly fund flows during the Asian and Russian crises to our 
measures of country transparency. Specifically, we look at flows relative to preceding month’s 
holdings of individual funds across countries during the period of the Asian and Russian crises, 
namely May 1997-September 1998.  [We have also examined the Asian and Russian crises 
separately, and found that the main conclusions are not sensitive to the choice of horizons.] The 
regression equation therefore had the form: 
  t j i i j
ijt









Where fijt is the flow of fund j into country i at time t, Aijt-1 are the assets of fund j in 
country i at time t-1, ηj is a fund fixed effect and νi a country random effect.  A negative value of  
α indicates that capital outflows are greater in less transparent countries.  
The basic results are reported in Table 11.  The coefficients on all measures of opacity 
consistently have a negative sign.  This suggests that more opaque countries indeed experience   - 19 -   
larger outflows during the crises (though the coefficient is not significant for the composite 
Ofactor measure).  In Table 12,  we observe that the link between outflow and opacity is still 
visible when controlling for other variables.  In particular, the coefficients on MACROPOLICY 
OPACITY and MACRODATA OPACITY are significant at the five percent level.  In a 
horserace between the three opacity indices, MACROPOLICY, MACRODATA, and 
CORPORATE OPACITY, reported in Table 13, only MACRODATA OPACITY enters 
significantly at the five percent level. 
Note that the estimation technique used here is relatively conservative, since in addition 
to fund fixed effects, we include country random effects, which can be expected to absorb a 
significant fraction of the variation in country characteristics. Instead of the ICRG risk measures, 
we also used crisis probabilities as predicted by the early warning model of Berg and Pattillo 
(1999) and Kaminsky, Lizondo, and Reinhart (1998) as controls, without changing the main 
results (not shown to conserve space).  
As a robustness check,  we also employ a measure of accounting standard quality 
proposed by La Porta, López-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998) (LLSV). The measure was 
published in 1991 and hence pre-determined relative to the investment positions of the funds in 
our sample. It turns out that the results using this variable are very similar to the ones obtained 




This paper represents a first assessment of the impact of country transparency on the 
behavior of international investment funds.   There are a few noteworthy findings.  First, we find 
relatively clear evidence that international funds prefer to hold more assets in more transparent 
markets.  Second, on the other hand, herding among funds is more prevalent in less transparent 
countries.  Third, there is some modest evidence that during a crisis, international investors tend 
to flee more opaque markets.  
We conjecture that the effects of opacity documented here are likely to represent a lower 
bound for the overall effects on the universe of international investors that go beyond specialized 
emerging market funds.  In future research, it would be useful to contrast these findings with the   - 20 -   
behavior of other players in international capital markets, and with that of domestic investors in 
these countries.  
   - 21 -  APPENDIX II 
Transparency Variables 
 
Measures of Government Transparency 
 
Transparency of Macroeconomic Policies  
 
Here, we rely on two measures developed by Oxford Analytica for Wilshire Associates. 
Wilshire Associates (2002) had in turn commissioned this work as part of an investment analysis 
on “permissible equity markets” produced for the California Public Employees’ Retirement 
System. Oxford Analytica delivered detailed reports for 27 countries, on which basis it assigned 
a score from 1 (least transparent) to 5 (most transparent) to fiscal and monetary policy. The 
reports were to a significant extent based on the IMF’s recent Reports on Standards and Codes 
(ROSCs) – the IMF, however, did not assign scores to individual countries. We use the sum of 
Oxford Analytica’s scores, which ranges from three to eight, and subtract it from ten and label 
the variable MACROPOLICY OPACITY. 
 
Frequency and Timeliness of Macroeconomic Data Dissemination 
 
The IMF has computed indices of the frequency and timeliness of national authorities’ 
macroeconomic data dissemination for all its member countries. The indices are available for 
1996, 1997 and 2000 (see Allum and Agça, 2001). We use the average of these three values and 
subtract them from ten. Then, we construct a simple average of the two variables and call it 




The Global Competitiveness Report includes results from surveys about the level of 
financial disclosure. The respondents have to assess the validity of the statement “The level of 
financial disclosure required is extensive and detailed” with a score from 1 (=strongly disagree) 
to 7 (strongly agree). We use the numbers appearing in the 2000 and 1999 issues (the questions 
were not covered in other issues), which are based surveys carried out one year earlier. We form 
a variable FINDIS by subtracting the original variable from eight. Similarly, the Global 
Competitiveness Report surveys the degree of “availability of information” about business. 
Again, we use the numbers appearing in the 2000 and 1999 issues, and form a variable AVAIL 
by subtracting the original variable ranges from eight. We construct a new summary variable, 




The accountancy and consulting company PricewaterhouseCoopers has recently 
conducted a survey of banks, firms, equity analysts, and in-country staff during the third and 
fourth quarters of the year 2000 to generate measures of opacity in five areas 
(PricewaterhosueCoopers, 2001): bureaucratic practices (corruption), legal system, government 
macroeconomic policies, accounting standards and practices, and regulatory regime. This 
variable is called OFACTOR.    - 22 -   
Data from International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) 
 
The International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) provides monthly values for 
22 components grouped into three major categories of risk: political, financial, and economic, 
with political risk comprising 12 components, financial risk 5 components, and economic risk 5 
components. Each component is assigned a maximum numerical value (risk points), with the 
highest number of points indicating the lowest potential risk for that component and the lowest 
number (0) indicating the highest potential risk. The maximum points able to be awarded to any 
particular risk component is pre-set within the system and depends on the importance 
(weighting) of that component to the overall risk of a country. 
 
The ICRG staff collects political, economic and financial information, and converts these 
into risk points for each individual risk component. The political risk assessments are made on 
the basis of subjective analysis of the available information, while the financial and economic 
risk assessments are made solely on the basis of objective data.  
 
The components, which are added to construct a risk rating for each subcategory, are 












Military in Politics 
Religious Tensions 





Financial Risk Components 
 
Foreign Debt as a Percentage 
of GDP 
Foreign Debt Service as a 
Percentage of XGS 
Current Account as a 
Percentage of XGS 
Net Liquidity as Months of 
Import Cover 





GDP per Head of Population 
Real Annual GDP Growth 
Annual Inflation Rate 
Budget Balance as a 
Percentage of GDP 
Current Account Balance as 
a Percentage of GDP 
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Table 1. Correlation Between Opacity Measures 
 






Overall  OFACTOR  1      
MACROPOLICY 
OPACITY  0.44 1      Government 
Opacity  MACRODATA 












Table 2. The Effect of Opacity on Investment by Global Funds 
 
























Number of obs.  29,621  24,944  31,180  31,180 
Fund fixed 
effects  Yes yes  yes yes 
Clustering by 
country-month  Yes yes  yes yes 
Adj. R
2 0.66  0.66  0.63  0.62 
 
Dependent variable: wijt. T-statistics in parentheses (based on robust standard 
errors, allowing for clustering by country-month). Regressions include fund fixed 
effects. Total number of countries: 19–21.    - 28 -   
Table 3. Opacity and Investment by Global Funds: Adding Control Variables 
 


































































































Number of obs.  25,255  21,672  25,379  25,844 
Fund fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Adj. R
2 0.66  0.66  0.63  0.60 
  
Dependent variable: wijt. T-statistics in parentheses (based on robust standard errors, allowing for error clustering by 
countries). Regressions include fund fixed effects. Total number of countries: 16.    - 29 -   
Table 4. Opacity and Investment by Global Funds: Adding Exchange Rate Regimes 
 

























































































































































Fund fixed effects  yes  Yes  yes  Yes 
Number of obs.  23,696  20,113  25,379  25,844 
Adj. R
2 0.69  0.69  0.64  0.62 
 
Dependent variable: wijt. T-statistics in parentheses (based on robust standard errors, allowing for error clustering by 
countries). Regressions include fund fixed effects. Total number of countries: 16.    - 30 -   
Table 5. Tests of Differences in Means of Holdings 
 
  Mean of difference 
between actual and 




Mean of difference 
between actual and 
MSCI weight for 
Opacity Measure above 
median (MDHI) 






OFACTOR  0.33 -0.16  0.000 
MACROPOLICY OPACITY  0.37 -0.07  0.000 
MACRODATA OPACITY  0.48 -0.25  0.000 
CORPORATE OPACITY  0.64 -0.39  0.000 
 
 
Table 6. Investment Levels: Horserace Between Transparency Measures 
(additional control variables not reported) 
 
Opacity variable 
Regression incl. only benchmark 
weights as control variable 
(as in Table 2) 
Regression incl. control variables 
(as in Table 3) 












Number of obs.  21,826 16,995 
Adj. R
2  0.66 0.77 
 
Table 7. Tests of Differences in Herding Means  
 
  Mean Herding 
(in %) for Opacity 
Measure Below 
Median (MHLOW) 
Mean Herding (in %) 
for Opacity Measure 
Above Median (MHHI) 





OFACTOR  6.6 9.0  0.03 
MACROPOLICY OPACITY  6.7 8.7  0.08 
MACRODATA OPACITY  7.4 8.6  0.29 
CORPORATE OPACITY  7.1 8.6  0.11 
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Table 8. Herding Regressions 
 
































Number of obs.  30  26  37  31 
R
2 0.16  0.33  0.13  0.31 
 
Note: T-statistics (based on heteroskedasticity-robust estimates) are given in parentheses. Regressions also include a 
constant (not shown). Coefficients that are significant at the 5 percent level are marked bold. 
 
 
 Table 9. Reaction to News 
 



























































































Fund fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Country fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
No. of obs.  53,763  45,897  56,469  59,231 
R
2 0.01  0.02  0.01  0.01 
 
The dependent variable is the change in country i’s weight in fund j's portfolio at time t, minus the weight at time t-
2: 2 , , , , − − t j i t j i w w . Regressions include fund- and country fixed effects. T-statistics are given in parentheses (based 
on robust standard errors, allowing for error clustering within funds).   - 32 -   
 
















































·ICRG Fin. Risk 
0.041 
(13.65) 
Fund fixed effects  Yes 
Country fixed effects  Yes 




The dependent variable is the change in country i’s weight in fund j's portfolio at time t, minus the weight at time t-
2: 2 , , , , − − t j i t j i w w . Regressions include fund- and country fixed effects. T-statistics are given in parentheses (based 
on robust standard errors, allowing for error clustering within funds).   - 33 -   
Table 11. Asian and Russian Crises: Fund flows and Opacity 
 





















2 0.04  0.05  0.04  0.04  0.05 
Country random effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Fund fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
No. of countries  27  26  34  30  22 
No. of obs  12,353  11,866  13,717  13,815  12,141 
 
Note: Dependent variable: Fund-level outflows by country over the period 97:05–98:09 divided by lagged assets in 
the respective country. Regressions include fund-fixed effects and country random effects. Z statistics are given in 
parentheses. *Significant at the 10 percent level. LLSVaccounting standards=100-original accounting standard 
variable reported in LLSV. 
 
Table 12. Asian and Russian Crises: Fund flows and Opacity, including Control Variables 
 








































ICRG Economic Risk 











ICRG Financial Risk 











ICRG Political Risk 












2 0.05  0.06  0.05  0.05  0.06 
Country random effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Fund fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
No. of countries  27  25  32  29  22 
No. of obs  10,758  10,153  11,735  12,008  10,572 
 
Note: Dependent variable: Fund-level outflows by country over the period 97:05–98:09 divided by lagged assets in 
the respective country. Regressions include fund-fixed effects and country random effects. Z statistics are given in 
parentheses. *Significant at the 10 percent level. LLSVaccounting standards=100-original accounting standard 
variable reported in LLSV.   - 34 -   
 














Turnover  0.204 
(3.28) 
GDP per capita  0.002 
(1.94) 
ICRG Economic Risk 
(lagged one month) 
-0.002 
(-3.45) 
ICRG Financial Risk 
(lagged one month) 
0.003 
(5.27) 
ICRG Political Risk 





Country random effects  Yes 
Fund fixed effects  Yes 
No. of countries  22 
No. of obs  9,037 
 
Note: Dependent variable: Fund-level outflows by country over the period 97:05–98:09 divided by lagged assets in 
the respective country. Regressions include fund-fixed effects and country random effects. Z statistics are given in 
parentheses. *Significant at the 10 percent level. LLSVaccounting standards=100-original accounting standard 
variable reported in LLSV.   - 35 -   
Table A1. Opacity Measures 
 












    
Argentina 40  0.20  2  3.13  55 
Bangladesh .  1.79  .  .  . 
Botswana .  3.32  .  .  . 
Brazil 34  0.11  2  3.03  46 
Chile 23  0.62  2  2.20  48 
China   1.87  7  4.23  . 
Colombia 39  1.27  3  3.57  50 
Czech Rep.  41  0.27  2  3.76  . 
Ecuador 42  0.55  .  5.06  . 
Egypt 39  1.81  6  3.66  76 
Ghana .  2.20  .  .  . 
Greece 37  1.55  .  3.13  45 
Hong Kong SAR  29  1.94  .  2.18  31 
Hungary 31  0.35  2  3.23  . 
India 38  1.45  4  3.22  43 
Indonesia 47  0.71  4  3.83  65 
Israel 35  0.63  3  2.29  36 
Jordan .  1.24  5  3.17  . 
Kenya 43  1.13  .  .  . 
Korea 42  1.00  3  3.25  38 
Malaysia .  0.86  4  2.86  24 
Mauritius .  2.91  .  3.14  . 
Mexico 33  0.32  3  3.36  40 
Morocco 34  1.59  4  .  . 
Pakistan 38  1.10  7  .  61 
Peru 38  0.46  3  3.39  62 
Philippines 37  0.38  3  3.40  35 
Poland 44  0.51  3  3.33  . 
Portugal .  0.56  .  2.88  64 
Romania .  0.41  .  .  . 
Russia 55  0.34  5  4.21   
South Africa  34  0.73  3  2.55  30 
Singapore 22  0.84  .  2.06  22 
Slovak Rep.  38  0.27  .  3.78  . 
Sri Lanka  .  1.12  6  .  . 
Taiwan   37  .  4  2.59  35 
Thailand 42  0.51  5  3.75  36 
Turkey 46  0.50  5  2.89  49 
Venezuela 42  0.90  6  4.28  60 
Zimbabwe 46  1.40  .  3.17  . 
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